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Introduction: Symposium on Constitutional Elitism
Robert F. Nagel*
In recent years the perennial debate about the judiciary's role in interpreting the
Constitution has taken on a new tone and emphasis. Despite the fact that it has been
almost three decades since the end of the Warren Court's period of flamboyant
creativity, the Supreme Court has continued to produce surprisingly "progressive"
decisions on freedom of speech, separation of church and state, equal protection,
and privacy. Because this record cannot be attributed either to ordinary partisan
loyalties or to respect for precedent, the recognition has begun to set in that more
fundamental institutional and cultural forces may be at play.
One diagnosis is that the Justices are giving expression to the moral and
political views of a certain social class. This view was given vivid expression in
Justice Scalia's dissents in Romer v. Evans,1 the case that invalidated Colorado's
anti-gay rights initiative, and United States v. Virginia,2 which ordered the Virginia
Military Institute to admit women. Scalia charged that these decisions represent
nothing more than the prejudices of the educated class and that the Court had
become an active participant in the "culture wars." Partly as a consequence of the
blunt forcefulness of these dissents, similar criticisms were soon getting widespread
attention in wider intellectual circles.3 Some serious observers even called for the
consideration of "possible responses to [decisions] that cannot be obeyed by
conscientious citizens."4
This Symposium is an effort to evaluate the accusation that constitutional law
has become a vehicle for implementing the dogmatic beliefs of an educated elite.
Interestingly, not one of the participants is satisfied with the terms of Scalia's
critique. Steven Smith suggests that the Court's apparent elitism might be a by-
product of an effort to give expression to the Framers' commitment to government
based on rational deliberation or reason, a commitment that naturally coincides with
the proclivities of many educated people. He notes, however, that the Framers'
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version of reason was premised on the existence of a providential natural design;
current uses of constitutional law, in contrast, rest on the modem worldview that
rejects the idea of a divinely ordered universe. While this secular position may be
held disproportionately in the educated classes, it is a widespread and profound
aspect of modernity. Therefore, if the Court is taking sides in the culture wars, that
is less because of the Justices' class-identification than because of their
commitment to modem rationalism.
Jeremy Rabkin, even more than Smith, denies that the Justices' membership in
the "educated elite" is the primary explanation for the Court's record.6 His review
of that record indicates that the Court is "a systematic partisan" for liberal values
and an opponent of the values of social conservatives, including highly educated
social conservatives. Sometimes, says Rabkin, contemporary liberalism is populist
and social conservatism is elitist. The real dividing line, he argues, is between those
who favor traditional moral norms and those who favor liberation from those norms.
To the extent that traditional morality is based on belief in an objective and divinely
ordered universe, then, Rabkin's highly political diagnosis of the Court's insistent
progressivism tracks Smith's more philosophical explanation.
Pamela Karlan and Daniel Ortiz think that Scalia's charge is true only in a
trivial sense and is "uninteresting."' They argue that modem constitutional law is
at base dogmatic in the same way that all social beliefs and practices must rest on
unquestioned premises. The interesting question for them is whether constitutional
law is more smug and intolerant than political decision making. On this they profess
to be agnostic, although they do note that courts are sometimes dogmatic of
intolerant political acts and that some judicial decisions promote an inclusive
politics. Moreover, while acknowledging that judges are inevitably a part of the
educated elite, Karlan and Ortiz (like Rabkin) assert that political outcomes can also
reflect elitism of various kinds. They conclude that the antidote to elitist dogma is
"careful and open-minded thought" about the meaning of the Constitution and of
democracy. Karlan and Ortiz do not, however, comment on the possibility, raised
by both Smith and Rabkin, that the very kind of intellectual process they are
recommending is hostile to traditionalists.
The contributions to this Symposium evaluate Justice Scalia's accusation from
three strikingly different perspectives-that of the philosopher, the political
scientist, and the constitutional theorist. Perhaps it is not surprising that the first is
somber, the second angry, and the third complacent.
6. Jeremy Rabkin, Partisan in the Culture Wars, 30 McGEORGE L. REv. 105 (1998).
7. Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, Constitutional Elitism? Some Skepticism About Dogmatic
Assertions, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 117 (1998).
